

HIST343: Modern Islam

Faculty of Arts and Sciences

School of Humanities

Assignment 2

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Marker's Notes – 87%

Expression: ✓✓

Bibliography: Impressive!

Argument:

Homeland Security Measures particularly in the US have proved affective in the US, but as you say if the causes of terrorism are not addressed then terrorism will continue to manifest and this is the key question. Has the war on terror ever calculated to deal with terrorism? For a time the neo-conservatives in the Bush administration argued that terrorism continued could be successfully reined in by systematically eliminating terrorists, but one generation of terrorists looks like being replaced by another. Thus it might be argued that the war on terror had other objectives. Certainly since terrorism is a strategy, not a state it would seem unlikely that "war" in a military sense is an appropriate or realistic way to combat it.

1. Assignment Question

Question 8: *American and Western reaction to September 2001 is understandable. The desire to punish the perpetrators and all who harboured them was overwhelming. But has the West gone about 'fighting' terror in a way that has been effective and promises to make the world a safer place to live in?*

2. Synopsis

Western powers have fought the war on terror using various methods including military action, prisoner detention and interrogation, enacting legislation, seizing terrorist funding and foreign aid. These methods have achieved some of their strategic anti-terrorist aims, but have not ensured world safety as they fail to address the root causes of terrorism. ✓

3. Essay

3.1 Introduction

In wake of the attacks of September 11 2001 (9/11), terrorism has been perceived as the most significant threat to world safety. The west has engaged in what then United States (US) President George W. Bush described as a 'war on terror'.¹ The war has raged for over ten years and questions have been raised as to its effectiveness in ensuring a safer world. Critics argue that western actions have been aimed more towards their own political interest rather than forging lasting peace.² Safety can only be achieved by addressing the root causes of terrorism in accordance with international human rights and civil liberties. Based on literature, this essay will consider three root causes of radical Islamic terrorism; poverty and lack of education; anti-western sentiment; and religion. It will then examine the strategic aims of five methods of combating terrorism; military action, prisoner detention and treatment; legislative action; seizure of terrorist finances; and foreign aid. Finally, the essay will assess their successes against these strategic aims and evaluate their effectiveness in ensuring safety. It will be demonstrated that, although many of these methods have achieved their strategic aims, they have not addressed the root causes of terrorism.

¹ George W Bush, 'The War on Terror', *Vital Speeches of the Day* vol. 72, no. 6, January 2006, p. 162.

² Jane Mayer, *The Dark Side*, New York, 2008, p. 7.

3.2 Root Causes

In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the global war on terror, terrorism's legitimacy and root causes must be examined. Scholars agree that terrorism consists of lethal violence for a political agenda.³ Research has focused on socioeconomic, and education conditions as potential causes of terrorism. According to Becker, evidence suggests that higher income and education levels decrease the likelihood of terrorism.⁴ These findings are also supported by research demonstrating a correlation between education levels and terrorist activity.⁵ Yet such research is inconclusive. Atran demonstrates that many terrorists come from well-educated, middle class backgrounds. Further evidence suggests that, despite literacy improvement in the Middle East, terrorist recruitment continues.⁶ Poverty and education alone are unlikely to cause terrorism. ✓

Comment [d1]: How do you explain this?

Anti-western sentiment is a significant cause of terrorism. Western powers have maintained a dominant presence in the Middle East from the late 18th Century to the present.⁷ By 9/11, over 12,000 US troops were located within Saudi Arabia and the Arabian peninsular.⁸ Since the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, in excess of 112,000 International Security Assistance Forces troops are now based within the Middle East, with further military bases located in Central Asia such as Uzbekistan.⁹ Coupled with military presence is western hegemony over natural resources. Continued reliance on oil ensures that it is in western interests to maintain political and economic influence within the Middle East.¹⁰ This is complemented by western support of oppressive and corrupt Middle Eastern regimes.¹¹ For example, US backing of the

Comment [d2]: More I think! ✓

³ Jason Franks, *Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism*, New York, 2006, p. 17.

⁴ Gary Becker quoted in Scott Atran, 'Mishandling Suicide Terrorism', *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 27, no.3, 2004, p. 74.

⁵ Jean-paul Azam and Véronique Thelen, 'The roles of foreign aid and education in the war on terror', *Public Choice*, vol. 135, no. 3-4, June 2008, p. 393.

⁶ Scott Atran, 'The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Bombers', *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 29, no. 2, 2006, p. 128.; Abdullah Yousef Sahar Mohammad, 'Roots of Terrorism in the Middle East. Internal Pressures and International Constraints' in *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward*, ed. Tore Bjørge, New York, 2005, p. 109.

⁷ Cyrus Masroori, 'European Thought in Nineteenth-Century Iran: David Hume and Others', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, vol. 61, no. 4, October 2000, pp. 658.

⁸ Atran, 'The Moral Logic', p. 130.

⁹ NATO-ISF, *International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Key Facts and Figures*, 10 September 2012, <http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf>, accessed September 11, 2012; Paul Rogers, 'Reconsidering the War on Terror: Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies', *RUSI Journal*, vol. 152, no. 4, August 2007, p. 32.

¹⁰ Noam Chomsky, *Hegemony or Survival*, New York, 2003, p. 214.

¹¹ Adam Yahyie Gadahn in Douglas Macgregor, Marvin Weinbaum, Abdullah Ansary and Robert Pape, 'The "Global War on Terror": What Has Been Learned?', *Middle East Policy*, vol. 15, no. 4, 2008, pp. 14-15.

corrupt Karzai regime in Afghanistan, and the promise of aid in return for military cooperation in autocratic Central Asian regimes such as Turkmenistan.¹² This dominance fuels hatred of the west in terrorist eyes. This hatred is further enhanced by ongoing western support for Israel in Palestine. The US in particular has been a strong supporter of Israel in Palestine since before its proclamation in 1948, despite Israel's proactive aggression in defending its borders.¹³ Since the 1970s Israel has invaded foreign territories on multiple occasions including Tunisia in 1985, and Lebanon in 1982, 1993, 1996 and 2006 to combat Palestinian militant groups; the Palestinian Liberation Organisation and Hezbollah. Irrespective of the justification, Israel has received continued backing from the US, encouraging Muslims and particularly Palestinians to look to terrorism in response.¹⁴ Anti-western sentiment is highly influential in terrorist support and recruitment.

Comment [d3]: Did they have any choice, do you think?

Religious identity plays a role in legitimizing terrorism. The origin of modern Muslim extremism can be traced back to the writings of Sayyid Qutb. Qutb wrote that the creation of an Islamic government was a commandment, realised only through armed 'struggle', or 'jihad'.¹⁵ Terrorist groups such as al Qaeda seek legitimacy through this vision and have openly called for the creation of pure Islamic states within the Middle East. However, research indicates that religious belief alone is not necessarily a cause of terrorism. A Gallop Poll after 9/11 revealed that seven percent of Muslims felt the attacks were justified for reasons of revenge or revolution; none claimed so in accordance with the Quran.¹⁶ Ideology in many cases is boosted by group identity rather than individual beliefs. Ginges, Hansen and Norenzayan demonstrate that support for terrorism amongst Palestinians was more likely based on attendance of prayer than pure religious belief.¹⁷ This group mentality is also supported by Henne who states that religion's universal nature allows a connection between individuals and groups across societies wishing to pursue political goals.¹⁸ Religion therefore

¹² Thomas Carothers, 'Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 82, no. 1, January 2003, p. 84.

¹³ Ritchie Owendale, 'The origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict', *Historian*, vol. 76, 2002, p. 23.

¹⁴ Chomsky, *Hegemony or Survival*, p. 194.

¹⁵ John L Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, New York, 2011, p. 238.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 242.

¹⁷ Jeremy Ginges, Ian Hansen and Ara Norenzayan, 'Religion and Support for Suicide Attacks,' *Psychological Science*, vol. 20, no. 2, February 2006, p. 229.

¹⁸ Peter S Henne, 'The Ancient Fire: Religion and Suicide Terrorism', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 24, no. 1, 2012, p. 41.

is a form of legitimacy rather than a cause; a means of justifying violent action with religious rhetoric.¹⁹ ✓

3.3 Fighting Terror

The military actions of the west, in particular the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq are the most significant forms of counterterrorism. The goal of military action in the war on terror is to disrupt terrorist groups by taking out supportive regimes and terrorist leadership by use of force.²⁰ After 9/11 the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) under article five (assist in bringing security to North Atlantic area by force if necessary) and the United Nations (UN) under article fifty-one (individual or collective state self-defence) backed the US led invasion of Afghanistan.²¹ In terms of the strategic aims of the invasion, there were successes. The Taliban regime was removed, and al Qaeda leaders such as Abu Zubaida and Abdul Rahim al-Nashiri have been captured.²² However the invasion has left many issues unresolved. Taliban and al Qaeda insurgents still move between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and strategic assaults and suicide bombings are frequent within the country.²³ The western backed Karzai government that replaced the Taliban regime has proved weak and corrupt, compelling coalition forces to work alongside local warlords, undermining efforts at democratic reconstruction.²⁴ Such actions along with ongoing support for corrupt Middle Eastern regimes reinforce anti-western sentiment. The use of force as part of the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan did achieve some strategic goals, however it failed to address the root causes of terrorism and indeed may have encouraged support for terrorist groups. ✓

The 2003 NATO backed invasion of Iraq has been the most controversial military action. Citing links between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda, and Iraqi stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the strategic goal of the invasion was the removal of Saddam Hussein's

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

²⁰ Frederick Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, 'How Not to Defeat al Qaeda', *The Weekly Standard*, vol. 15, no. 3, October 2009, p.24.

²¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The North Atlantic Treaty (1949)*, 1 April 2009, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf, accessed 10 September 2012, p. 1; United Nations, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, 2004, <http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf>, accessed 8 September 2012, p. 63.

²² Agence France-Presse, 'Al Qaeda Leaders Who Have Been Captured Or Killed', 2 May 2011, <http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/global-filipino/world/05/02/11/al-qaeda-leaders-who-have-been-killed-or-captured>, accessed September 12 2012.

²³ Rogers, 'Reconsidering the War on Terror', p. 33.

²⁴ Paul B Rich, 'Counterinsurgency or a war on terror? The war in Afghanistan and the debate on Western strategy', *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, vol. 21, no. 2, 2010, p. 415; Corine Hegland, 'It's Great to be a Warlord in Afghanistan', *National Journal*, vol. 37, no. 45, November 2005, p. 3464.

regime.²⁵ Again, strategic successes were achieved, notably Saddam Hussein's removal from power and eventual capture, as well as subsequent victories over al Qaeda Iraq (AQI) in recent years.²⁶ However the invasion has acted as a catalyst for terrorist support and attacks. Prior to the invasion there was no significant al Qaeda presence in Iraq, suggesting that the aforementioned western victories over AQI are a point of contention.²⁷ Former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) anti-terrorist expert Michael Scheuer concludes that 'US forces and policies are completing the radicalisation of the Islamic world... the United States of America remains bin Laden's only indispensable ally.'²⁸ Suicide bombings rates increased after the commencement of the Iraq War. Two weeks after President Bush declared victory in Iraq, suicide bombers attacked Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Israel and Chechnya.²⁹ In Iraq alone between 2003 and 2010 the number of documented suicide bombings reached 1003 with 12,284 civilian deaths.³⁰ Despite attaining some of its strategic goals, the Iraq war has failed to achieve any lasting safety, particularly in the Middle East.

Comment [d4]: Interesting point!

As well as increased terrorist support, the Iraq war has been marred by global condemnation. The US justified the invasion by citing UN resolution 1441 admonishing Iraq's non-compliance with regards to disclosure of its weapons programs.³¹ Before the invasion, members of the UN including France, Russia and Germany blocked a resolution legitimising an attack on Iraq, believing that further intelligence was required.³² Added to this is the unreliability of the evidence provided as the basis for the invasion. British intelligence promoting the link between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda was revealed as being based upon a student essay and not MI6 intelligence, while US reliance on intelligence sources with their

²⁵ Wyn Rees and Richard J Aldrich, 'Contending cultures of counterterrorism: transatlantic divergence or convergence?', *International Affairs*, vol. 5, 2005, p. 914.

²⁶ Andrew Phillips, 'How al Qaeda lost Iraq', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 63, no. 1, 2009, p. 65.

²⁷ Bruce Riedel, 'Al Qaeda Strikes Back', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 86, no. 3, May 2007, <http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.une.edu.au/docview/214287853?accountid=17227>, accessed 12 September 2012.

²⁸ William A Cohn, 'Targeting Terror', *The New Presence (Online)*, 2010, <http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.une.edu.au/docview/865338576?accountid=17227>, accessed August 28 2012.

²⁹ Scott Atran, 'Mishandling Suicide Terrorism', p. 71.

³⁰ Madelyn Hsiao-Rei Hicks, Hamit Dardagan, Peter M Bagnall, Michael Spagat and John A Sloboda, 'Casualties in civilians and coalition soldiers from suicide bombings in Iraq, 2003-10: a descriptive study', *The Lancet*, vol. 378, no. 9794, September 2011, p. 906.

³¹ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1441*, 8 November 2002, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/1441.pdf>, accessed September 12 2012, p. 3.

³² Tassos E Fakiolas and Efstathios T Fakiolasb, 'Europe's "Division" over the war in Iraq', *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, vol. 7, no. 3, September 2006, p. 299.

own agendas has also proved dubious.³³ Moreover, coalition forces in Iraq failed to locate any WMDs and subsequent intelligence sources have admitted to fabricating evidence of their existence.³⁴ Global disapproval of the Iraq war serves to reinforce terrorists' anti-western stance.

Since the Obama administration has come to power in the US, western military strategy has leaned towards use of long-range technology. Encouraged by technological advances, 118 Predator drone attacks were made in 2010 alone, compared with 45 under President Bush's entire administration.³⁵ By targeting hideouts along the borders of Pakistan and Afghanistan, unmanned drones have engaged in successful elimination of terrorist leaders including Baitullah Meshud, leader of the Pakistani Taliban and Saad bin Laden, son of Osama bin Laden.³⁶ Since commencing drone attacks, civilian casualties have decreased from 45 percent to 20 percent.³⁷ Despite these apparent victories, drone attacks have drawbacks. Public opinion, particularly in Pakistan has grown strongly against coalition forces.³⁸ Coupled with the covert attack which killed al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in 2011, anti-American sentiment grows as US forces appear free to act with impunity on foreign soil.³⁹ ✓✓

Detaining of suspects and prisoners by western powers is the most notorious method of counterterrorism. Suspects held in prisons such as Guantánamo Bay in Cuba, and Abu Ghraib in Iraq have been seen as vital to intelligence on terrorist networks and organisations, as well as keeping potential terrorists from harming the public. The use of 'extraordinary rendition' whereby terrorist suspects are captured on foreign soil and handed to allied interrogators, usually within the Middle East, is another method of anti-terrorism.⁴⁰ One example of extraordinary rendition was the CIA's abduction of Hassan Osama Nasr, a member of Islamic

³³ Alexander Cockburn, 'Colin Powell and the Great "Intelligence" Fraud', in Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair, *Imperial Crusades: Iraq, Afghanistan and Yugoslavia*, London, 2004, pp. 208-209.

³⁴ Martin Chulov and Helen Pidd, *Defector Admits to WMD Lies that Triggered the Iraq War*, 15 February 2001, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/15/defector-admits-wmd-lies-iraq-war>, accessed September 12 2012.

³⁵ Trevor McCrisken, 'Ten years on: Obama's war on terrorism in rhetoric and practice', *International Affairs*, vol. 87, no. 4, July 2011, p. 793.

³⁶ Peter Baker, 'Obama's War Over Terror', *New York Times Magazine*, January 2010, pp. 39, 46.

³⁷ McCrisken, 'Ten years on', p. 795.

³⁸ Bobby Ghosh, 'The End of Al-Qaeda?', *Time*, September 2012, p. 23.

³⁹ Adnan R Khan, 'Igniting the fire', *Maclean's*, vol. 124, no. 20/21, May 2011, p. 30.

⁴⁰ Rees and Aldrich, 'Contending cultures', p. 918.

group al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya in Italy in 2003, and his subsequent interrogation in Egypt.⁴¹ In contrast the European Union (EU) has created the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), a framework for arresting suspected terrorists within the EU in accordance with international law. It acknowledges 'requests for the surrender of a person by the judicial authority of another member state' allowing legal and efficient extradition around Europe.⁴² The US and its Middle Eastern allies have been prepared to utilise 'the Dark Side' to gather intelligence and ensure safety, however such treatment of terrorists is not supported by the EU.⁴³

The difference between the US and EU on detainees is the interpretation of terrorism. The US view terrorism as an act of war, allowing for indefinite detention without trial, and trial by military court.⁴⁴ The Obama administration has attempted to embrace 'moral' counterterrorism in recent years by abandoning extraordinary rendition and torture. The aforementioned case against Hassan Osama Nasr was decided in Italian courts; Nasr was released and the CIA operatives involved were found guilty in absentia of kidnapping.⁴⁵ However Guantánamo Bay remains open to the fifty or so inmates who pose an 'unconventional threat'. Due to evidence given under improper methods such as torture, they cannot be convicted of terrorism.⁴⁶ The US deems the detainees as 'unlawful combatants' and ensures their indefinite detention by refusing to accord them rights of combatants under the Geneva Convention.⁴⁷ This again serves anti-American propaganda. The EU sees terrorism as a criminal act. EU clandestine agencies abide by the European Council of Human Rights, thus legitimising their actions.⁴⁸ Relations between EU member states have strengthened with measures such as the EAW. Cooperation has been stifled between the EU and US due to interpretation of international law. In 2005 US attempts to seize terror suspect Hararran Rashid Aswat in South Africa were blocked by the United Kingdom (UK), unwilling to submit a British citizen to extraordinary rendition.⁴⁹ Until western allies agree to follow international

⁴¹ Maria De Cristofaro and Sebastian Rotella, *Judge in Italy convicts 23 Americans in 2003 CIA kidnapping of Egyptian cleric*, 5 November 2009, <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/nov/05/world/fg-italy-verdict5>, accessed 7 September 2012.

⁴² Elies van Sliedregt, 'European approaches to fighting terrorism', *Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law*, vol. 20, no.3, 2010, p. p415.

⁴³ Quote from Dick Cheney in Cohn, 'Targeting Terror'.

⁴⁴ Leigh M Johnson, 'Terror, torture and democratic autoimmunity', *Philosophy Social Criticism*, vol. 38, no. 1, January 2012, p. 117.

⁴⁵ De Cristofaro and Rotella, *Italy convicts 23 Americans*.

⁴⁶ McCracken, 'Ten years on', p. 789.

⁴⁷ Cohn, 'Targeting Terror'.

⁴⁸ Rees and Aldrich, 'Contending cultures', p. 919.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 919.

law with regards to human rights, anti-western sentiment will increase and multilateral efforts and counterterrorism will suffer ensuring safety cannot be guaranteed. ✓

Western powers have enacted anti-terrorism legislation in order to ensure the safety of their citizens. The US Uniting and Strengthening America Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act was enacted in 2001. It increased the powers of law enforcement, particularly with regards to surveillance and intelligence sharing, to thwart terrorism.⁵⁰ In 2002 the 'Lackawanna Six' were arrested over alleged links to al Qaeda in the US. The Patriot Act enabled intelligence sharing between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and CIA leading to the subsequent conviction of the men.⁵¹ However critics of the legislation claim that authorities have too much power. One such example is the Material Witness statute, allowing detention of a material witness in criminal proceedings.⁵² Despite having been cleared by Spanish authorities over the Madrid bombings in 2004, American Brandon Mayfield was detained for two weeks as a suspect without charge. Officials finally released Mayfield, subsequently paying two million dollars in compensation.⁵³ Around the world similar legislation has been enacted. The Terrorism Act of 2000 (amended in 2006) in the UK also increased the powers of law enforcement. For example the 2006 Act permits detention without charge for twenty-eight days.⁵⁴ However, as with the Patriot Act, there are implications over civil liberties. As van Sliedregt notes, the Act implies that innocence must be proven over guilt.⁵⁵ In some instances, cases have been overturned, for instance the case of three Algerian men prosecuted for 'possession of property for the purposes of terrorism'.⁵⁶ Under the terms of the Act the accused are required to prove that such an article would not be used for terrorist actions.⁵⁷ The House of Lords overturned

⁵⁰ USA PATRIOT Act 2001, Title II, s. 201; *Ibid.*, Title VII, s. 701.

⁵¹ Dan Herbeck, *Patriot Act enabled 'Lackawanna Six' probe*, 26 December 2005, <http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.une.edu.au/docview/381694757?accountid=17227>, accessed September 3, 2012.

⁵² Duke Law, *PART C: Material Witnesses*, <http://web.law.duke.edu/publiclaw/civil/index.php?action=showtopic&topicid=23>, accessed September 13, 2012.

⁵³ Eddlem, Thomas R. 'Anti-Fourth Amendment Patriot Act: Congress is considering extending three provisions of the USA Patriot Act, but they would do better to repeal the whole unconstitutional law', *The New American*, April 2011, p. 17.

⁵⁴ Terrorism Act 2006 (UK), Part 2, s. 23 (7) 3 (b) ii.

⁵⁵ Elies van Sliedregt, 'European approaches to fighting terrorism', *Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law*, vol. 20, no.3, 2010, p. p423.

⁵⁶ Terrorism Act 2000 (UK), Part VI, s. 57 (1).

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, Part VI, s. 57 (2).

the case as it violated ‘presumption of innocence’.⁵⁸ While legislation enacted for the protection of western nations has offered increased powers for law enforcement, the loss of civil liberties does question the safety of individuals.

By targeting funding of terrorist organisations, western allies hope to deter and disrupt terrorism, as well as provide vital intelligence. The Terrorism Financial Tracking Program (TFTP) is a US led programme that has had some success in tracking down and preventing terrorism. In July 2006 UK authorities foiled a plot to detonate liquid explosives on numerous aircraft bound for the US.⁵⁹ Also, al Qaeda leader Mustafa Abu al-Yazid stated that ‘there are hundreds willing to carry out... operations but they can’t find the funds to equip themselves’ in an interview in 2007.⁶⁰ However, tracking terrorist funding is a multilateral effort that risks violation of privacy. The TFTP relies heavily on European financial data from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). In February 2010 the European Parliament rejected US access to SWIFT information citing the violation of the EU Data Protection Directive.⁶¹ Revisions of the prior agreement have improved security conditions, and an agreement was reached in July 2010.⁶² Multilateral financial sanctions may prove an effective counter to terrorism provided it ensures some measure of privacy.

Research has shown a correlation between aid and the reduction of terrorism. Azam and Delacroix have demonstrated that military aid is useful for fighting terrorism, however it is more politically influential than militarily.⁶³ Research shows that military aid in Yemen may have prolonged conflict there. The west continues to offer aid so long as fighting is ongoing; it is hardly in Yemen’s interest to wipe out terrorism.⁶⁴ While this is detrimental, it has

⁵⁸ van Sliedregt, ‘European approaches’, p. 423.

⁵⁹ Matthew Levitt, ‘Follow the money: leveraging financial intelligence to combat transnational threats’, *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 12, no. 1, 2011, p. 34.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41. Levitt.

⁶¹ Marieke De Goede, ‘The SWIFT Affair and the Global Politics of European Security’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 50, no. 2, March 2012, p. 214; The Working Party, *Press Release on the SWIFT Case following the adoption of the Article 29 Working Party opinion on the processing of personal data by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication*, 23 November 2006, http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/news/docs/PR_SWIFT_Affair_23_11_06_en.pdf, accessed September 13 2012.

⁶² Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc., *Obama on U.S.-EU agreement on terrorist finance tracking program*, 8 July 2010, <http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.une.edu.au/docview/594807993?accountid=17227>, accessed September 13 2012.

⁶³ Jean-Paul Azam and Alexandra Delacroix, ‘Aid and the Delegated Fight Against Terrorism’, *Review of Development Economics*, vol. 10, no. 2, 2006, p. 343; Azam and Thelen, ‘The roles of foreign aid’, p. 379.

⁶⁴ Navin A Bapat, ‘Transnational terrorism, US military aid, and the incentive to misrepresent’, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 48, no. 303, April 2011, p. 316.

political benefits for the donor. Yemen is a strong supporter of US policy and has little incentive to support terrorist organisations.⁶⁵ In order to improve living conditions, aid needs to be sector specific, for example education.⁶⁶ This will improve standards of living and yield positive political results for the donor, however it is unlikely to combat terror.⁶⁷ Financial aid to nations struggling against terror serves a more political purpose than achieving safety.

3.4 Addressing Root Causes

The methods of combating terror examined fail to address the root causes of terrorism. The strategic goals of military campaigns, improper treatment of detainees, anti-terrorist legislation and financial sanctions all target the symptoms of terrorism rather than preventing recruitment. Foreign aid does have potential to improve living conditions with the possibility of preventing terrorism, however the current allocation of funds appears to aim at more political results rather than safety. The west must target different areas to ensure world safety. One such area is to discourage the radicalization of Islam by promoting alternative interpretations of Islamic doctrine. An example of this is the Al-Munasahah counselling program in Saudi Arabia where radical Islamic detainees and sympathizers are engaged in religious dialogue in the importance of tolerance.⁶⁸ As of 2008 half of the 3,200 prisoners have left detention with less than one percent reverting to their former beliefs.⁶⁹ Underlying conditions facilitating terrorist popularity must be removed. Ending the occupation of Middle Eastern states, ceasing support of corrupt regimes, and ending military action and torture of prisoners are essential.⁷⁰

All efforts to address the root causes of terrorism must be multilateral and abide by international law.⁷¹ If countries act unilaterally they open themselves to global condemnation and deny themselves advantages in combating terrorism, such as partners' intelligence. These actions must be in accordance with international law such as the Geneva Convention of 1949. As Niall Ferguson writes, 'dilution of the Geneva Convention, far from protecting America from terror could end up exposing them to it'.⁷² Dialogue between western allies and

Comment [d5]: And Ferguson may be considered a conservative scholar!

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 305.

⁶⁶ Joseph K Young and Michael G Findley, 'Can peace be purchased? A sectoral-level analysis of aid's influence on transnational terrorism', *Public Choice*, vol. 149, no. 3-4, 2011, p. 378.

⁶⁷ Azam and Thelen, 'The roles of foreign aid', p. 379.

⁶⁸ Macgregor et al., 'Global War on Terror', p. 8.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁷⁰ Chomsky, *Hegemony or Survival*, p. 210.

⁷¹ MacGregor et al., 'Global War on Terror', p. 7.

⁷² Niall Ferguson in Mayer, *The Dark Side*, pp. 84-85.

insurgent groups can lead to lasting peace. Some efforts are taking place in the Middle East between members of the Taliban and Afghan government. While promising, McCrisken notes that problems may arise if talks are held at the same time as NATO strikes against the Taliban within Pakistan.⁷³ The Israel-Palestine issue is another major stumbling block on the road to lasting peace. The only way to come to any solution in Israel is to offer a 'honourable solution to the Palestinians respecting their right to self-determination'.⁷⁴ Only by addressing the root causes of terrorism can safety in the world be assured.

⁷³ McCrisken, 'Ten years on', pp. 797-798.

⁷⁴ Yehoshaphat Harkabi quoted in Chomsky, *Hegemony or Survival*, p. 213.

3.5 Conclusion

An enduring safety has not been achieved by the war on terror. Strategic aims of military conflict have been achieved, notably the removal of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and the death or capture of al Qaeda leaders including Osama bin Laden. Yet dubious intelligence over links between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda, and the non-existence of WMDs in Iraq, as well as ongoing occupation of Middle Eastern lands in general have raised serious questions over the legitimacy of these conflicts. This serves as propaganda for radical Islamic terrorism. While many terrorists have been killed or apprehended, their improper treatment is a denial of human rights and again, further incentive for terrorist recruitment. While legislation and seizure of terrorist funding has proved useful at preventing terrorism, questions over violation of civil liberties and data protection have tarnished such efforts. Foreign aid has potential as an effective preventative measure, however at present it appears more politically advantageous for the donor, and may in fact prolong terrorism unless it is sector specific. Safety cannot be measured on the elimination of terrorists; it is achieved by denying the root causes of terrorism.⁷⁵ Lasting peace can only be achieved by eliminating terrorist recruitment stemming from anti-western propaganda, offering alternative interpretations of Islamic doctrine, and dialogue between the opposing parties.

⁷⁵ Kurt M Campbell and Richard Weitz, *Non-Military Strategies for Countering Islamist Terrorism*, September 2006 in The Princeton Project Papers, http://hawk.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/28786/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/d3bf1bb1-48b9-4970-9f79-6550644042d5/en/Non_Military_Strategies_Countering.pdf, accessed September 7 2012.

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Excerpt from Adam Yahye Gadahn, reproduced in Macgregor, Douglas, Marvin Weinbaum, Abdullah Ansary, and Robert Pape. 'The "Global War on Terror": What Has Been Learned?', *Middle East Policy*, vol. 15, no. 4, 2008, pp. 14-15.

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